By Marcia Sowles
On February 28, 2026, in the midst of ongoing U.S.-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale military attack on Iran. Unlike the U.S-Israeli military strikes in June, these strikes targeted more areas and with more intensity. As to be expected, the attacks provoked a series of other attacks across the entire region with Iranian missile and drone strikes against Israel as well as UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain and Israeli strikes on portions of Lebanon. The Church of the Brethren has called for a cessation of the attacks by U.S. and Israel and for Iran to end its retaliatory strikes.
The results have been devastating and are rapidly spiraling out of control:
- As of April 11th, more than 3,753 civilians have been killed across the region since the start of the war – at least 1,701 civilians have died in Iran, including 165 girls at a school on the first day; over 2,000 in Lebanon; 27 in Israel; 10 in the West Bank, and more than 32 in other Gulf countries. 13 members of U.S. armed services have also been killed.
- Millions have been forced to flee their homes. It is estimated that more than 3 million in Iran and at least 1 million in Lebanon have been displaced. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stresses that the rapid escalation of hostilities puts displaced people at special risk due to intensifying conflict, with potential movements to neighboring countries. The countries surrounding Iran already play a significant role hosting displaced people, making additional displacements an undue strain on their communities and public services. Prior to the war, Iran itself hosted at least 1.6 million refugees, most of whom are Afghans.
- The strikes have hit civilian targets. Israeli strikes have hit oil storage in Iran, starting fires and plumes of toxic fumes called acid rain. US-Israeli strikes have also hit Iranian infrastructure and more than 40,000 civilian buildings, including 10,000 homes and 25 hospitals in Iran. Iran’s counterstrikes have likewise hit residential and other non-military targets in Israel and the Gulf states.
- The flow of maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz has been halted, raising the price of oil and other commodities like fertilizers. This is impacting not only consumers in the U.S. but around the world. It has also delayed critical food and medical supplies to children in Gaza, Afghanistan and Sudan.
- UNESCO, the United Nations body that protects scientific and cultural sites, has documented at least four historic Iranian sites have been damaged by the strikes.
In addition to the human cost, the financial cost of the war to the U.S. taxpayers has been enormous — $ 11.3 billion in the first six days or $1.3 million a minute. See Nicholas Kristof, “The $1.3 Million a Minute War,” New York Times (March 21, 2026). This money could have been used to fund important social programs to fund health care, housing, and education. For example, for less than three weeks of the war, or $35 billion, the federal government could fund a nationwide pre-K program for 3- and 4-year-olds. Id. For less than 13 hours of the war ($1 billion), the government could provide free screening to all uninsured women who need it. Id. For about $34 billion a year, less than three weeks of war, the federal government could restore health insurance subsidies that the Administration let expire last year. Id.
This reckless war of choice raises not only moral concerns but also serious legal issues. This article will focus on the violations of international law regarding the use of force against another nation and the limitations on the Executive Branch power set forth in the U.S. Constitution and the War Powers Act. It will also explore ways in which Congress can exercise its power of the purse to limit funding for the war.
UN Charter on Prohibition Against the Use of Force Against Another Nation
The U.S. military action taken against Iran violates one of the key provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, namely that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” UN Charter, Art. 2(4). The only exceptions to this prohibition against the use of force are set forth in Article 51, which permits the use of force in instances of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs” or with the U.N. Security Council authorization.[1]
The military attack by U.S. and Israel on Iran is a clear violation of the Article 2(4) prohibition. There was no Security Council authorization. Nor was there a legitimate claim of self-defense. If Article 51’s reference to “if an armed attack occurs” is read literally, it closes the door on self-defense claims when an armed attack has not occurred. Recognizing that self-defense may not be at all effective if there were a major imminent attack, Article 51 has been interpreted to permit a pre-emptive self-defense action in anticipation of an attack in limited circumstances if certain strict conditions are met. Under this interpretation, the use of force in anticipatory self-defense is legitimate only when the necessity is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” To meet this narrow exception, the following conditions must be met: (1) the threat is imminent; (2) peaceful alternatives to addressing the supposed threat—including diplomacy—are unavailable or exhausted; and (3) the response is proportionate to the threat. None of these conditions were met here.
No Imminent Threat Although the Administration has tried to justify the attack based a potential nuclear attack, there was no reason to believe such an Iranian nuclear attack was “imminent.” See Arms Control Association, “Did Iran Nuclear & Missile Programs Pose an Imminent Threat? No” Issue Report (March 3, 2026) (ACA Issue Report”). In fact, the Administration has not pointed to any evidence that Iran currently has any nuclear weapons. Indeed, President Trump boasted that the U.S. strikes in June “decimated” the Iranian nuclear capability. “To assume that the rebuilding effort has been successful to a level where Iran can imminently launch an attack against the United States, and has formed the intent to do so, is beyond credulity.” Michael Schmitt, Tess Bridgeman and Ryan Goodman, “Expert Q&A: Are U.S. Threats or Use of Force Against Iran Lawful?,” Just Security (Feb. 28, 2026) (“Schmitt, Bridgeman, & Goodman”) Imagery from Iran’s two operating uranium enrichment facilities bombed in June “supports the assessment that the sites are not operating.” ACA Issue Report. Moreover, although “Iran has continued activities at nuclear facilities that were unaffected by the June strikes” and “may be cleaning up or stabilizing some of the nuclear sites that were struck,” there was “no evidence to suggest that Iran is resuming proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, such as uranium enrichment, that would be necessary to produce nuclear material for a bomb.” Id. Furthermore, even if Iran had a nuclear weapon, there was no evidence that it had any immediate plan or ability to use it against the United States. Although Iran does possess a sophisticated ballistic missile program, “there is no evidence to suggest that Iran was on the verge of developing a ballistic missile capable of targeting the United States.” Id.
Indeed, statements made by the Administration’s own intelligence officials undercut any claim of an imminent threat. In her written statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 18, 2026, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, stated: “As a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was obliterated. There have been no efforts since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. The entrances to the underground facilities that were bombed have been buried and shuttered with cement. We continue to monitor for any early indicators on what position the current or any new leadership in Iran will take with regard to authorizing a nuclear weapons program.” In her oral testimony, Ms. Gabbard said that Iran “could” combine technology from its existing space program with its missile development capabilities to “begin to develop” an intercontinental ballistic missile “before 2035, should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability.”[2]
In short, the Administration has presented no evidence of any “imminent threat.” Instead, the Administration is stretching the self-defense exception to include a broader self-defense theory based on more inchoate threats.[3] Such a theory is not supported by the weight of legal scholars. See Brian Finucone, “An Unserious Justification for an Unnecessary War: Assessing the U.S. ‘Article 51’ Letter to the UN,” Just Security (March 18, 2026). Indeed, in 1981, the United States joined a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 487 in condemning a preventative Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak. The resolution found that Israel’s actions violated Article 2(4) due to the absence of any evidence that Iraq had launched or was planning to launch an attack that could justify Israel’s use of force. It recognized that the presence in a State of the military capacity to injure or even destroy another State cannot itself be considered a sufficient basis for the defensive use of force.
Availability of Peaceful Alternatives The preemptive self-defense exception also fails because alternative means for addressing the threat were available and had not been exhausted. In the first place, the Administration’s claim that the peaceful alternatives were not available ignores the fact that it was the first Trump administration that withdrew the United States from the multilateral nuclear deal with Iran that the Obama administration had negotiated and implemented along with the other permanent members of the Security Council and European allies to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. Among other conditions, that agreement capped uranium enrichment levels and capacity and placed inspection measures by the International Atomic Energy Administration in exchange for economic sanction relief.
Moreover, negotiations were underway, and reports indicated that they were “showing Iran’s apparent willingness to curtail its nuclear program.” David Cortright, “Trump’s War on Iran is the Obliteration of Diplomacy,” Center for International Policy (March 30, 2026) (https://internationalpolicy.org/publications/jcpoa-factsheet-cortright/). “Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi told reporters after the last round of talks on February 26 that the parties made ‘good progress’ in reaching agreement. Araghchi reported that technical teams would meet the following Monday in Vienna to work out the details. ‘It was one of our best negotiating sessions,’ he added.” Id. “The mediator of the talks, Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, also reported hopefully, by declaring that the United States and Iran made “substantial progress” toward a nuclear deal.” Id. IAEA Director Rossi was less optimistic in his assessment but said there was a possibility of an agreement and confirmed that technical talks were scheduled. Id. See also Schmitt, Bridgeman & Goodman (reports indicated the Iranians were “negotiating seriously, even if not entirely to the United States’ satisfaction”).
Lack of Proportionality of the Attack Even if the first two conditions of self-defense were met, which they were not, the military action by US and Israel fails to meet the requirement of proportionality. The attacks have not been limited to military targets linked to military sites related to Iranian nuclear program but have impacted homes and other residential buildings, hospitals, schools, and infrastructure. Indeed, on the first day, one strike hit a girl’s school killing more than 160 students. As of mid-March, the Iranian Red Cresent reports that “67,414 civilian sites have been struck, of which 498 are schools and 236 health facilities.” UNHR Press Release (March 19, 2026). Such strikes to civilian structures and infrastructure have continued with a strike destroying a large bridge and threats by President Trump to strike Iranian power system and “blasting Iran into oblivion or, as they say, back to the Stone Ages!!!” The strikes have also damaged historical cultural buildings designated by UNESCO. Such strikes violate not only the proportionality requirement; they also violate the international humanitarian laws, including the Geneva Convention which mandates protection of civilians and injured combatants. See Geneva Convention on the Law of War, Art. 3 (1949); “Over 100 International Law Experts Warn that U.S. Strikes on Iran Violate UN Charter and May Be War Crimes,” Just Security (April 2, 2026).
This total disregard of international law is extremely disturbing, but unfortunately not surprising in view of prior statements by the Administration. In a January interview with the New York Times, President Trump stated, “I don’t need international law,” asserting that his power as commander-in-chief is constrained only by his “own morality” and “own mind.” Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has also repeatedly made statements indicating that he did not believe that the U.S. should be bound by international law. With respect to the Geneva Convention, he stated that U.S. soldiers should not be bound by rules written by “dignified men” 80 years ago. In an Oval Office press briefing on Sep. 5, 2025, he stated that the Department of War will conduct its operations with “maximum lethality, not tepid legality.” On September 30, 2025, at a meeting of more than 800 officers at Marine Corps Base Quantico, he proclaimed: “We fight to win. We unleash overwhelming and punishing violence on the enemy. We also don’t fight with stupid rules of engagement. We untie the hands of our warfighters to intimidate, demoralize, hunt and kill the enemies of our country. No more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement, just common sense, maximum lethality and authority for warfighters.” Just days into Operation Epic Fury, in a press briefing on March 2, 2026, he repeated that the U.S. military would be bound by “no stupid rules of engagement.” Secretary Hegseth has also weakened the oversight of military operations by gutting the offices designed to assist in military targeting to protect civilians by reducing by 90%.
The violations of the UN Charter and international law by the US-Israeli attack sets a dangerous precedent. As Yale Law School Professors Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro warned last year with respect to the decline in the respect for international law: “If the world’s most powerful state can flout long-settled expectations with impunity, others are likely to feel they can do the same. And once states no longer expect one another to play by the rules, the system that depended on that expectation will crumble—not all at once, but piece by piece until it collapses altogether.” Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, “Might Unmakes Right: The Catastrophic Collapse of Norms Against the Use of Force, Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2025). This disregard for the UN Charter is especially troubling because it follows on the heels of US attack of Venezuela on January 3rd and the attack on Iran last June. “It is not just the existing international legal system that is in jeopardy now. At risk is the survival of any rule at all –and without them any constraint on the exercise of state powers.” Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, “A World Without Rules.” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2026. See also Oona Hathaway, “The Great Unraveling Has Begun,” New York Times (Jan. 6, 2026). This violation of Article 2(4) should be especially troubling to members of the Church of the Brethren because it has long recognized the importance of international law. Our 1947 Annual Conference declared: “We urge our nation not to side-step the United Nations, but to be the first to offer the surrender of our national sovereignty to a world government of, by, and for the peoples of the world; and to be ready to spend resources on its promotion and establishment commensurate with our national in spending for purposes of destruction.” “Resolution on Peace,” Minutes of the 161st Recorded Annual Conference of the Church of the Brethren, held at Orlando, FL, 10-15 June 1947, 92). Similarly, the 1996 Annual Conference Statement calls on us to “encourage the United States and other countries to comply with existing international laws and accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as compulsory.” Nonviolence and Humanitarian Intervention, 1996 Annual Conference Statement
Constitutional Limitations on the Executive Branch and the War Powers Act
The military action taken against Iran also violates the limitations set forth in the U.S Constitution and the War Powers Act of 1973 on the powers of the President. The framers of the Constitution were concerned that the powers of the federal government should not be vested in a single individual or body. Accordingly, the Constitution set forth a system of checks and balances with respect to both military and domestic affairs. Indeed, the framers viewed placing the power to initiate war in a single person or entity was particularly dangerous. In the debate on the ratification of the Constitution, John Jay warned in Federalist No. 4 that
absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.
James Madison echoed the same concern. As he wrote in 1793, “[t]hose who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, adding that the aggrandized power and honors the executive enjoys in wartime means “the temptation would be too great for any one man.” Letters of Helvidius I.
Therefore, although Article II of the Constitution provides that the President “shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress—not the President—the exclusive power to declare war. Section 9 of Article I also limits the power for a President to make war by giving Congress the power of the purse.
Over the course of history, however, these checks on the President’s power failed to be effective bar in preventing Presidents from initiating or entangling the United States in undeclared wars. In 1973, in response to the Vietnam War, Congress enacted the War Powers Act of 1973 to provide a procedural framework to reinforce Congress’ checks on the President. See 50 U.S.C. 1544 -1548. The War Powers Act requires the President “in every possible instance shall consult with Congress” before introducing the U.S. military and must report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, id. 1542 -1543[4] and report periodically on the status, scope, and duration of such involvement, id. 1542(c). It contemplates two means of legislative control: (1) a supposed deadline requiring forces must be removed within 60 days (with a possible 30-day extension for safe withdrawal) unless Congress declares war or grants authorization, id. 1544(b), and (2) use of a concurrent resolution requiring the President to remove troops, id. 1554(c). Under the Act, any member of the House or Senate, regardless of committee assignment, can invoke section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution and get a full floor vote on whether to require the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities.
Unfortunately, the War Powers Act has not restored the balance in powers as its sponsors had hoped. As Professor Harold Koh has noted, the Act has certain “glaring” examples of porous drafting. See Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution in the 21st Century 102-103 (2024). First, the 60-day time limit “means that the president can take short-term military action of less than 60 days with little check or oversight.” Id. at 103. See also Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power at 145 (2004) (“by recognizing that a President may use armed forces for up to 90 days without seeking or obtaining legislative power, the [Act] ‘legalizes a scope for independent presidential powers that would have astonished the framers’”). Second, although it requires the President to consult “in every possible instance,” it “allows the president to decide what that means.” Koh, at 102. Third, although the Act requires the president to consult “Congress”, it does not “specify how many members must be consulted or how far in advance.” Id. With respect to Iran, President Trump only notified the eight leaders of the intelligence committees (known as the “gang of eight”). Fourth, “it covers only U.S. ‘armed Forces’ physically ‘introduced’ into foreign territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat and thus arguably do not apply to private contractors acting under covert government instructions, let alone twenty-first century drones, robots or cyber conflicts.” Id. at 102-03. Fifth, it permits the president to file three different types of reports depending on the situation but only one type of report – the so-called hostilities report triggers 60-day time limit. Id. at 103.
Other scholars have suggested other improvements to the Act. See Tess Bridgeman & Stephen Pompei, “2022 Update: Good Governance Paper No. 14: War Powers Report,” Just Security (Jan. 21, 2022). They suggest: (1) amending the Act to provide a clear definition to the term “hostilities;” (2) shortening the current 60-day “termination clock,” removing “the temptation for the Executive Branch to seek what they characterize as “a quick unauthorized win” and “creating further incentives for the president to consult meaningfully with Congress before getting the United States involved in hostilities;” (3) increasing the quality of reporting to Congress by the executive branch to ensure “reporting is more than a box-ticking exercise,” thereby enabling Congress to take more informed votes; and (4) instituting an automatic funds cut-off at the expiration of the termination clock to create a strong “remedy for non-compliance (defunding) that the current statute lacks.” Id.
Despite its flaws, the War Powers Act is still a means that can be used to limit presidential warmaking. Unfortunately, efforts by Congress to use the War Powers Act to restrict military action with respect to Iran have thus far failed. On March 4, 2026, a joint resolution introduced by Senators Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Raul Paul (R-Ky.) was defeated 47-53. On the same day, a joint resolution introduced by Representatives Thomas Massie (R-Mass.) and Ro Khanna (D-Ca.) in the House also failed to pass 212-219. On March 18, 2026, another joint resolution introduced by Senator Booker (D-N.J.) failed by 47-53. House and Senate Democrats have stated that they will soon introduce new resolutions updating the resolutions to reflect the developments in the conflict as well as the sentiment of voters, a majority of whom oppose the war, according to recent polls. On April 15, another resolution introduced by Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-Il) failed 47-52 with Senator Jim Justice (R-W.Va.) not voting. Even when such resolutions fail, they do serve an important purpose by forcing members to go on the record as to their position on the war. This allows voters to hold their representatives accountable for their vote in the upcoming election.
Congress’ Power of the Purse
In addition to the power to declare war, the Constitution also grants Congress another check on the President’s power: the power of the purse. Article 1, Section 9 provides that “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” The framers of the Constitution viewed the “power of the purse” as an important check on Executive power. In Federalist 58, James Madison described the power of the purse as the “most compleat and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.” The framers viewed this power as reinforcing Congress’ check on the President’s power to commence and conduct a war. See Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power 11 (2d ed 2004). As James Madison explained,
Those who are to conduct a war cannot by the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing the power of enacting laws.
6 The Writings of James Madison 148 (emphasis in the original). See also 5 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 123 (praising the transfer of the war power “from the executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay”); 1 Farrand 139-40 (George Mason stressing that the “purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands (whether Legislative or Executive”).
Congress can exercise its power of the purse in two ways. First, Congress can simply refuse to enact appropriations and use legislative inaction to block requested funding. Unlike its authority under the War Powers Act which requires affirmative action by Congress, mere congressional inaction on appropriations by itself may serve as a restraint. Second, Congress can attempt to enact specific funding restrictions or prohibitions through affirmative legislation. Such legislation is, however, subject to presidential veto (which would require supermajorities of both chambers to overcome).
Congress will soon have an opportunity to exercise its power of the purse with respect to the Iran War. As noted above, it is estimated that the war cost was $11.3 billion in just its first six days. In March, the Administration reported that it will seek supplemental appropriations of $200 billion to fund the Iran war. There are now reports that it may reduce the amount of the supplement request to $80 to $100 billion. The reduced figure is largely the result of the Admiration’s record-breaking annual defense budget request for $1.5 trillion in total defense spending for next year (an increase from $1 trillion this year). There are also reports that the Administration may spin $350 billion of its total defense appropriation request for next year into a separate appropriation.
No matter how it is packaged, exercising its power of the purse “presents a potential source of leverage for Congress to curtail further executive warmaking.” Brian Finucane, “Iran, War Powers, and the Power of the Purse: Leverage or Legalization,” Just Security (March 9, 2026). Under the first option, Congress could refuse to approve the Administration’s request for additional funding. In view of the 47 votes in favor of the recent War Powers Resolution in the Senate and the growing opposition to the war, there is a viable chance of defeating a supplemental appropriation bill.
The second method – enacting funding restrictions – is generally used in the context of an annual appropriations bill, not a request for supplemental funding which by its very nature is limited to a specific purpose. If the Administration’s request for supplemental funding is broader, Congress could also seek to impose specific funding restrictions.
The second option would in any case be available in response to the FY 2027 appropriations bill. Congress has used this option to restrict military operations. For example, Congress placed restrictions on funding for the Vietnam War. Section 307 of P.L. 93-50, which went into effect on August 15, 1973, provided that:
None of the funds herein appropriated under this act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam by United States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other act may be expended for such purpose.
This provision represented a compromise between Congress and the White House after President Nixon vetoed an earlier supplemental appropriation bill which included an immediate funding prohibition.
In 1994, Congress included two provisions restricting funding in the appropriations act See DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995, P.L. 103-335. Section 8135 enacted funding restrictions to ensure the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. Id. (“None of the funds appropriated in this act may be used for the continuous presence in Somalia of United States military personnel, except for the protection of United States personnel, after September 30, 1994”). Title IX enacted funding restrictions with respect to U.S. military operations in Rwanda. Id. (“No funds provided in this act are available for United States military participation to continue Operation Support Hope in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any action that is necessary to protect the lives of United States citizens”).
In short, the power of the purse can be used as a check on the President’s warmaking, and we should encourage Congress to use it.
Conclusion
The military attack by the United States on Iran violates Article 2(4) of the UN charter and the limitations on the power of the President under the U.S Constitution. The results have been devastating in every respect. It has resulted in more than 3,700 civilian deaths, displacement of millions, and economic damage around the world. It has also undermined the rule of law and increased global tensions. Moreover, the use of force is not an effective means of preventing nuclear proliferation, it likely only increased the desire for Iran or others to acquire nuclear weapons.
We have the opportunity to use our voices to speak out against the war. We can contact our Representatives and Senators to ask them to support the resolutions under the War Powers Act to end the conflict and ask them to oppose increases in military funding. We can also participate in prayer vigils and public actions to register opposition to this current war and prevent further violations of international law and unchecked actions by the President. We must continue to speak out whenever the US government initiates war and continue to advocate for policies that make it difficult for any one official to make such a costly decision.
[1] See United Nations Charter, Art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
[2] But when pressed by Senator Jon Ossoff (D-GA), Director Gabbard refused to provide an assessment of the threat Iran posed. “It is not the intelligence community’s responsibility to determine what is and is not an imminent threat,” she said, adding that such assessments were solely the discretion of the president.
[3] In its reach to find some justification for the attack, the United States has also stretched the definition of “imminent threat” by asserting that it must “account for [Iran’s] decades of malign foreign and domestic conduct,” citing a litany of Iranian bad acts dating back to 1979—the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the Marine barracks and Khobar Towers bombings, roadside bomb attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, and Hamas’s atrocities of October 7th. See Brian Finucone, “An Unserious Justification for an Unnecessary War: Assessing the U.S. ‘Article 51’ Letter to the UN,” Just Security (March 18, 2026). But, as Mr. Finuncone concludes, “[a]s horrific and unlawful as many of these actions were, they do not individually or collectively give rise to a right for the United States or Israel to use force in self-defense against Iran in 2026.”
[4] The written report must include (a) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of the military, (b) the constitutional and legislative authority under which introduction took place, and (3) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. 50 U.S.C 1543(a).