By Marcia Sowles
At our 2026 Annual Conference, the Church of the Brethren adopted a Resolution on Weapons Transfer. The resolution reaffirms “the Church of the Brethren’s commitment to peace as God’s will and the call of Christ” and states the church’s “opposition to the U.S. manufacturing and sale of weapons and urges the U.S. government to halt the sale of arms to other countries.” As explained in the resolution, the United States is currently the world’s largest exporter of weapons with 39 percent of global weapons imports in 2023 coming from the U.S. Id. The U.S. is the top supplier to Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Kuwait, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and many other countries. Id.
Many of these weapons are exported to countries actively engaged in military conflicts and raise serious humanitarian concerns. Id. For example, Israel has used U.S. weapons in its attacks in Gaza and Lebanon, killing countless civilians. Such arms transfers to Israel are continuing. On September 15, 2026, the Administration announced plans for the transfer of more than $2.8 billion in arms to Israel. See “Trump’s Planned Sale of Controversial Bombs to Israel is the Largest in Years,” Washington Post (Sept. 16, 2026); “Trump Approves $2.8 Billion Arms Transfer to Israel, Including 40,000 One-Ton Bombs,” NY Times (Sept. 16, 2026). The one-ton bombs included in the proposed sale have been widely used by Israel in densely populated areas of Gaza. Id. Although the proposed transfer is described as a “sale,” it is actually financed by U.S. tax dollars. Id. U.S. military aid to Ukraine has included types of weapons that are banned by international treaties such as cluster munitions and landmines. See Resolution at 1.
Considering the harm caused by such arms, the Resolution calls upon us to educate ourselves and others about the impact of U.S. arms trade and to engage in advocacy and other non-violent actions to oppose U.S. arms transfer. To advocate for change, it is important to understand the current legal restrictions on arms transfers, how they can be used to advocate against transfers, and how they can be improved.
The restrictions on arms transfers are governed by both federal and international law. This article will focus on the restrictions under U.S. law. Federal law regulates two types of arms sales: (1) foreign military sales (“FMS”), where the U.S. government sells military articles to a foreign purchaser, and (2) direct commercial sales (“DCS”), where a U.S. company sells military articles to a foreign purchaser. The U.S. also provides grants or loans to foreign countries to purchase of military articles.
The principal statutes governing arms transfers are the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (“AECA”) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”). Each statute delegates to the President the authority to approve arms transfers but sets forth the guiding principles for the executive branch to follow before approving any transfer. Both statutes also establish congressional oversight mechanisms. In addition to the restrictions initially set forth in these acts, they have been amended to add two provisions known as the “Leahy Laws” which prohibit seek certain arms transfers to foreign military units creditably linked to gross violations of human rights. Moreover, Congress can exercise its power of the purse by restricting the use of appropriated funds.
Arms Export Control Act
The AECA was enacted in 1976 as an attempt to reassert Congressional authority over arms sales. Congress’ authority to regulate arms sales derives from its authority “to regulate commerce with foreign nations” under Article I, Section 8, and its “power of the purse” under Article 9 which states that “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” Prior to the enactment of the AECA, Congress had largely delegated its authority to regulate arms to the President. Federal law only required the Secretary of State to report significant arms sales to Congress.However, in 1970s, following the Vietnam War, Watergate, and issues raised by arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other countries, there was growing concern with unchecked “Imperial Presidency.” In response, Congress passed a series of reforms to reassert its oversight authority in foreign affairs, including the AECA.[1] The AECA sought to restore Congressional oversight arms transfers by (1) setting forth guiding principles that the executive branch must follow before authorizing a transfer, (2) imposing requirements for the President to notify Congress of certain arms transfers, (3) allowing Congress to override an arms transfer with a joint resolution of disapproval, and (4) mandating the establishment of end-use monitoring program
Guiding Principles
The AECA begins with a declaration stating that “an ultimate goal of the United States continues to be a world which free from the scourge of war and dangers and burden of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law, and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.” 22 U.S.C. 2751. However, it goes on to reaffirm the conventional belief that a collective military defense system is still essential: “the United States and other free independent countries continue to have a valid requirement for effective and mutually beneficial defense relationship in order to maintain and foster the environment of international peace and security essential to social, economic and political progress.” Id.
Under the AECA, sales may “be approved only when they are consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United States, the purposes of the foreign assistance program of the United States as embodied in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.], the extent and character of the military requirement, and the economic and financial capability of the recipient country, with particular regard being given, where appropriate, to proper balance among such sales, grant military assistance, and economic assistance as well as to the impact of the sales on programs of social and economic development and on existing or incipient arms races.” Id. The AECA also specifically requires the executive branch to “take into account whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.” 22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(2).
Notification Requirements of Arms Transfers
The AECA, with certain exceptions, requires the Executive Branch to notify Congress of a sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more and defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more 30 days before the issuance of an export license for DCS or the government’s agreement for FMS. 22 U.S.C. 2776(b-c). The chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (“SFRC”) or House Foreign Affairs Committee (“HFAC”) may also request an additional notification from the executive branch 30 days before shipment of defense articles that meet the value threshold. 22 U.S.C. 2776(i). Arms transfers to members of NATO, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand require only 15 days’ notice and have higher notification thresholds of $25 million for major defense equipment and $100 million for defense services and defense articles. 22 U.S. 2276(b-c).
This notice requirement can be avoided by the Executive Branch in two ways. First, the AECA allows the Executive Branch to bypass the prior notice requirement if the President states in a certification to Congress “that an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States” and submits a report supporting his certification. 22 U.S.C. 2776(c). The term “emergency” is not defined in the statute thus giving the President broad discretion to make that determination.
This provision has been used by presidents to bypass the notification requirement. For example, in 2019, citing a threat from Iran, President Trump relied upon this waiver provision to authorizes $8.1 billion in sales to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates and other countries. See Diana Ohlbaum & Rachel Stohl, “An ‘Emergency’ Arms Deal: Will Congress Acquiesce in Another Blow to its Authority,” Just Security (June 6, 2019). The report provided to support the use of the waiver did not demonstrate the existence of an emergency need for the weapons and some on the weapons included would take years to produce and deliver. Id.[2] In February of 2025 and March and May of 2026, President Trump also used this provision to provide arms to Israel and other countries in the Middle East. See Congress Research Report RL 31675: “U.S. Fast Tracks Arms Deals Valued at $8.6 Billion to Middle East Allies (May 13, 2026). In December 2023, President Biden relied upon the emergency waiver provision to authorize a $106.5 million sale to Israel and to provide arms to Ukraine in response to Russia’s attack. Id.
Second, the executive branch can bypass the Congressional review requirement by dividing large transfers into smaller transactions that evade notification requirements. For example, in August 2020, the State Department inspector general found that the department had approved 4,221 arms transfers totaling $11.2 billion to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from January 2017 to 2020 which had not been reported to Congress. See State OIG Report ISPL-20-19: “Review of Dept. of State’s Role in Arms Transfer to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia & UEA at 11 (Aug.2020). It noted that some of the below-threshold transfers were done at a time when there were congressional holds on larger, above-threshold transfers of similar items. Id.
Blocking Transfers by a Joint Resolution of Disapproval
The AECA gives Congress the power to block or modify any arms transfer under DCS or FMS through a joint resolution of disapproval. 22 U.S.C. 2776(c).[3] The effectiveness of a Joint Resolution is, however, limited because Congress needs to either secure the President’s signature or override the President’s veto with a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate.[4] Although Congress has never successfully overrode a vetoed joint resolution of disapproval pursuant to theAECA, this provision can have an impact. For example, in 1986, President Reagan formally notified Congress of a proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of defense articles and services, including 1,700 Sidewinder missiles, 100 Harpoon missiles, and most controversially, 200 Stinger missile launchers and 600 Stinger missile reloads. See Arooshe Pahooja Giroti, “Made in the USA: The Constitutional Crisis Behind America’s Arms Export Regime,” 114 Georgetown Law Rev. 413, 433 (2026). Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval. Although President Reagan then vetoed the resolution, he modified the sale to exclude the most controversial Stinger missiles and launchers in the sale proposal. Id. Moreover, even when a resolution is unsuccessful, forcing a vote on an arms transfer can provide a means for raising concerns and public debate on such transfers. It also provides a means of holding individual members accountable for their vote in elections.
End-use Monitoring Program
The AECA directs the President to establish an end-use monitoring program (“EUM”) to provide reasonable assurance that recipients of U.S. arms are complying with U.S. government requirements concerning the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and defense services and that such articles and services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided. 22 U.S.C. 2785a (1-2). The responsibility for EUM has been divided into two programs: (1) the Gold Sentry program, managed by the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and responsible for EUM of government-to-government foreign military sales; and (2) the Blue Lantern program, managed by the Department of State and responsible for EUM of arms sold via direct commercial sales.
Unfortunately, the current end-use monitoring programs are not “practically geared towards investigating, verifying, or preventing inappropriate use of U.S. arms.” Center for International Policy, Civilians in Conflict, & Simpson, Demystifying End Use Monitoring in U.S Arms Exports. They were designed during the Cold War and focus on concerns that U.S. defense technology may fall into the hands of the Soviet Union or aligned regimes. Accordingly, the programs focus “almost exclusively on protecting technology from diversion by confirming the physical location of exported defense articles, ensuring the physical security of those items, and verifying that they remain reasonably under the control of the agreed-upon end-user.” Id.
The AECA also requires the President to notify Congress when “substantial violations” of arms transfer agreements, including end-use agreements, may have occurred. Such violations include unauthorized retransfer, 22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(1)(a), and use of arms for purposes other than internal security, legitimate self-defense, counter-proliferation measures, or participation in collective security arrangements, 22 U.S.C. 2754. Substantial violations render a country ineligible to receive security assistance subject to a presidential waiver upon written certification to the Congress or a congressional determination by joint resolution. The State Department has reported one substantial violation of end use to Congress under this provision of the law, according to GAO review of State documentation. See GAO Report 25-107077, Human Rights: State Can Improve Response to Allegations of Civilian Harm by U.S. Arms (April 2025). The violation involved the Central African Republic’s unauthorized transfer of U.S. origin vehicles to a third party in 2021.
If the end-use monitoring program focused, as it should, to include more than unauthorized transfers to third parties, it would also be monitoring to ensure that the arms are only used for “legitimate self-defense.” See 22 U.S.C. 2278. Customary international law requires that self-defense must be necessary and proportional to the threat faced. Reports by various human rights organizations indicate that the use of U.S. missiles by Israel has killed thousands of civilians in Gaza and thus go beyond any legitimate claim of self-defense against Hamas. [5] For example, the U.S. one-ton bombs which have been used by Israel (and are included again in the recently announced transfer to Israel) are among the most destructive. See Trump’s Planned Sale of Controversial Bombs; “Trump Approves $2.8 Billion Arms Sales to Israel, Including 40,000 One-Ton Bombs,” NY Times Sept 16, 2026. A blast from such bombs can be lethal for 1,000 feet and leave a crater up to 50 feet deep. Reports indicate that the bombs were used in densely populated areas on Gaza where Israel had steered civilians for their “safety.” Id. In addition, Israel’s attacks struck hospitals, school and civilian infrastructure.[6] Such uses not only go well beyond any claim of self-defense but raise serious violations of other international laws. See UN Human Rights Council Report: Legal Analysis of the Conduct of Israel in Gaza Pursuant to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Sept. 16, 2025) (finding that “the facts and circumstances may amount to violations of international humanitarian laws, including genocide”).
Foreign Assistance Act
The FAA is the U.S. law that provides the framework for most foreign assistance and security assistance. In 1974, it was amended to provide an explicit human rights standard for U.S. security assistance. The FAA states that “a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased observance of internation- ally recognized human rights by all countries. 22 U.S.C. 2304(a). It authorizes the United States to furnish defense articles to another country to internal security, legitimate self-defense, participation in “regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” Id. It seeks to implement the protection of human rights in four ways: (1) a prohibiting security assistance to a country with a pattern of violations, (2) a requiring the State Department to issue an annual human rights report, (3) establishing a mechanism for Congress to request additional information, and (4) providing a mechanism for Congress to enact a joint resolution of disapproval of security assistance to a country.
Prohibitions on Assistance
Section 502B of the FAA prohibits the U.S. government from providing security assistance, including arms transfers, to “any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights.” 22 U.S.C. 2304(a). The FAA defines gross violations of internationally recognized human rights to include (1) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (2) prolonged detention without charges and trial, (3) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and (4) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person. 22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1). This is a broad probation. Unlike the Leahy Laws, which require the human rights violations to be linked to the use of U.S. arms (see infra at 6), the human rights violations do not need to be linked to the use of the arms.
Annual Human Rights Report
Section 502B requires the President to provide annually “a full and complete report . . . with respect to practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country proposed as a recipient of security assistance.” 22 U.S.C. 2304(b). The State Department implements this requirement through its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices issued by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.
The adequacy of such reports as a tool for restricting assistance, however, depends on the funding and priority that the Administration assigned to human rights violations. Unfortunately, the current Administration has not made human rights a priority and has significantly cut the budget for the office and reduced its staff. As a result, the annual report issued in August 2025 was approximately one-third in size of other prior reports and eliminated discussion of entire categories of human rights concerns, such as LGBTQ, that were not statutorily required. See “State Department Slashes Its Annual Report on Human Right,” NPR (Aug. 12, 2025). In addition, an internal State Department memorandum directed staff to cut down the number of examples of each violation to just one “illustrative incident,” regardless of how widespread the abuses were. Id. “In practice, this means a country with a pattern of press intimidation or torture is criticized for only one violation, erasing the broader scale of repression.” Id.
Request by Congress for Additional Information
Congress, however, does not need to depend exclusively on such reports for its oversight. Under the FAA, it can seek further information in two ways. First, any member of Congress can introduce a simple resolution requesting a report from the Secretary of State regarding human rights or other concerns in a particular country. 22 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1). Second, HFAC or SFRC can request such information by letter. If the Secretary of State does not provide a report within thirty days, “no security assistance shall be delivered to such country except as may thereafter be specifically authorized by law from such country unless and until such statement is transmitted.” Id. at 2304(c)(3). In January 2024, Senator Bernie Sanders forced a historic floor vote by introducing a Section 502B(c) resolution demanding a State Department investigation into Israel’s human rights compliance during its military campaign in Gaza. See S. Res. 504, 118th Cong. 2d Sess. (2024). The resolution, however, was voted down in committee.
Joint Resolution of Disapproval
After receiving such a report from the Secretary of State, Congress may adopt a joint resolution terminating or restricting a transfer. Although Congress has not passed such a resolution, human rights organizations have suggested this provision together with the provision for requesting reports on human rights can be a useful check. See John Chappell, “The Rise and Fall of Section 502B,” 21 Northwestern Journal on Human Rights 1 (2025). Even if such resolutions fail, they can bring the issues into public discussion and provide a means of holding representatives accountable for their vote.
Leahy Laws
The “Leahy Laws” refers to two statutory provisions that limit the transfer of arms and military assistance based on human rights concerns. They were included in appropriations laws in 1996 in response to reports by Amnesty International and other international organizations documenting egregious human rights violations committed by certain Latin American military units which had received U.S. military assistance. The Leahy laws are now codified in two statutory provisions: (1) State Department Leahy law, 22 U.S.C. 2378d, applies to foreign assistance and foreign operations funds (such as Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training) and is tied to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and (2) the Department of Defense Leahy law, 10 U.S.C. 362, applies strictly to funds appropriated to the DOD.
Unlike Section 502B of the FAA, the Leahy Laws do not cut off arms transfers to the entire country. Instead, they prohibit furnishing assistance to foreign security units when the U.S government “has credible information connecting those units to gross violations of human rights.” The State Department has adopted the definition of gross violation of human rights established in Section 502B of the FAA. Unlike Section 502B of the FAA, the Leahy Laws do not require a consistent pattern of gross violations.
The Leahy Laws have limitations. First, the Executive Branch has interpreted the provisions as only applying to security assistance granted with appropriated funds. Congressional Research Service Report: Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting at 2 (Jan. 6, 2025). Accordingly, it has not been applied to military sales or direct commercial sales. Second, the prohibition does not apply if the country is taking corrective steps. See 22 U.S.C. 2378d(b) (if Secretary of State determines that the country is “taking effective steps to bring responsible members of the security forces to justice”); 10 U.S.C. 362(b) (after consulting with one another, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense conclude that the government of the recipient country “has taken all necessary corrective steps”). Third, the prohibition can be waived. The DOD may waive the prohibition after consulting with the State Department if extraordinary circumstances require it, 10 U.S.C. 262(c), and the State Department may waive it if the President deems the assistance to be important to the United States’ interest. 22 U.S.C. 2378d(c). If a waiver occurs, the President must provide a report within fifteen days to the appropriate committees of Congress with a detailed explanation of the national interests in question. Finally, several funding authorities for both Departments also have a “notwithstanding” provision, which exempts programs or whole funding authorities (such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund) from Leahy and other legal requirements. See Daniel Murphy, “The Leahy Law Prohibiting U.S. Assistance to Human Rights Abuses,” Just Security (June 27, 2017).
Despite the limitations, the Leahy Laws have been used to prevent the acquisition of U.S. weapons by specific units in the militaries of Colombia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. See Annielle Sheline, “Under Primacy Weapons Sales Will Always Supersede Human Rights,” Quincy Brief No. 7 at 11 (April 2026). “Notably, the Leahy Laws have not been applied to U.S. partners in the Middle East, like Israel, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, despite documented evidence of gross violations of human rights repeatedly conducted by specific units of their militaries.” Id. Accord Patrick Leahy, “I Created the Leahy Law. It Should Be Applied to Israel,” Op-ed Washington Post (May 20,2024).
Conclusion
In sum, U.S. laws impose some restrictions on arms transfers. Unfortunately, the laws have gaps, and the mechanisms for Congressional oversight have not been used as vigorously as they could. Moreover, the effectiveness of Congress’ primary tool for blocking a transfer – a joint resolution — is limited because it requires a two-thirds vote in both houses to overcome a presidential veto.
Nevertheless, the laws can have some impact. As noted above, President Regan did modify an arms package to Saudi Arabia even though he vetoed the joint resolution of disapproval. Moreover, even where Congress does not garner sufficient votes to pass a joint resolution, the debate on the resolution can be a way of raising the concerns about the arms transfer. Similarly, the release of a public report requested under Section 502B(c) of the FAA regarding human rights conditions in the target country could provide a valuable resource for advocacy organizations and create an opportunity for public education and advocacy.
There are also proposed reforms to strengthen congressional oversight and limiting the president’s power. See National Security Powers Act, S.239, 117th Cong. (2021), and National Security Reforms and Accountability Act, H.R. 4928, 118th Cong. (2023). They propose to “flip the script” by amending the AECA to require prior approval of foreign arms sales of certain weapons most likely to be used in war, above a certain level. Under the current bills, the presumption of approval would still remain for NATO allies. See Lora Lumpe, “Arms Sales: the Case for Affirmative Approval,” Democracy Journal (2024). Although such legislation is not likely to be enacted under the current Administration, we can use this time to educate ourselves about our current law and start to propose and advocate for reforms in U.S. laws regarding arms transfer. The serious harms raised by such arms transfers are too important to ignore.
[1] These included the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq., National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1621 et. seq., the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. 1801 et. seq. and the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C 2151 et seq.
[2] The Inspector General for the State Department Steve Linck initiated an investigation questioning the emergency nature of the sale. See Diana Ohlbaum & Rachael Stahl, “Yes Congress there is Something You Can Do About Reckless Arms Sales, Just Security (June 9, 2020). The Inspector General was subsequently fired before completing the investigation. Id.
[3] A joint resolution of disapproval under the AECA is privileged in the Senate. This allows any senator to bring the resolution to the floor for consideration if it does not leave SFRC within ten days. Resolutions in the House, however, do not this option. Accordingly, HFAC must vote to refer the resolution to the House floor.
[4] When Congress originally passed the AECA in 1976, a concurrent resolution without a presidential signature could override an arms transfer. In 1983, the Supreme Court held that such provisions were unconstitutional. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Thereafter, Congress amended the AECA in 1986 to require a joint resolution.
[5] UNRWA Situation Report No. 221 (July16, 2026) found that at least 72,618 individuals have been killed in Gaza and another 172,462 have been injured.
[6] See “Mapping the Damage to Gaza Hospitals: Battered, Abandoned and Raided,” Washington Post (May 21, 2024).